ETK-2026-3451Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number.
waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.description
Servers using @better-auth/electron from 1.5.0-beta.12 onward may disclose authentication and social-provider client secrets during sign-in, allowing a user who can authenticate to impersonate other known-email users. A separate second-factor bypass affects deployments that enable twoFactor(), register electron() first, and permit password sign-in for users enrolled in two-factor authentication.
mitigation
Upgrade both @better-auth/electron and better-auth to 1.7.16, or to 1.8.0-beta.5 on the beta release line. Rotate the authentication secret and all configured social-provider client secrets; remove the electron() plugin until upgrade if necessary.
fixed in 1.7.16, 1.8.0-beta.5
outcome
Contextual, not validated: no deterministic check could cover this one, and no technique passed our review.
source signals
Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.
- 2026-11-03 21:38Zghsa: trigger signal, started the run
this entry in the feed
GET /api/v1/feed/ETK-2026-3451
{ "etk_id": "ETK-2026-3451", "cve_id": null, "display_id": "ETK-2026-3451", "ghsa_id": "GHSA-9p5w-h4pr-fcrc", "euvd_id": null, "status": "published", "anchor_state": "awaiting_cve", "title": "Secret disclosure and two-factor bypass in @better-auth/electron", "summary": "Servers using @better-auth/electron from 1.5.0-beta.12 onward may disclose authentication and social-provider client secrets during sign-in, allowing a user who can authenticate to impersonate other known-email users. A separate second-factor bypass affects deployments that enable twoFactor(), register electron() first, and permit password sign-in for users enrolled in two-factor authentication.", "mitigation": "Upgrade both @better-auth/electron and better-auth to 1.7.16, or to 1.8.0-beta.5 on the beta release line. Rotate the authentication secret and all configured social-provider client secrets; remove the electron() plugin until upgrade if necessary.", "vendor": "npm", "product": "npm:@better-auth/electron", "affected": [ { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ ">= 1.5.0-beta.12, < 1.7.16" ], "ecosystem": "npm", "fixed_versions": [ "1.7.16" ], "package_name": "@better-auth/electron", "purl": "pkg:npm/@better-auth/electron" }, { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ ">= 1.8.0-beta.0, < 1.8.0-beta.5" ], "ecosystem": "npm", "fixed_versions": [ "1.8.0-beta.5" ], "package_name": "@better-auth/electron", "purl": "pkg:npm/@better-auth/electron" } ], "cwes": [ 201 ], "cvss_score": 8.1, "cvss_src": "cna_vendor", "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N", "epss_score": null, "epss_percentile": null, "epss_asof": null, "automation": "contextual", "check": false, "check_confidence_basis": null, "exploit": false, "pipeline_minutes": 11.643129583333334, "t0_at": null, "signals": { "trigger_signal": { "at": "2026-11-03T21:38:09+00:00", "days": -0.34215304868055557, "is_lower_bound": true, "measured_at": "2026-11-04T05:50:51.104460+00:00", "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-9p5w-h4pr-fcrc" } } }
published 2026-11-04 04:50Z
last change 2026-11-04 05:49Z
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