ETK-2026-3419Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number.
waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.description
Deployments using the better-auth phone-number plugin are affected by improper handling of unverified phone numbers; installations without a custom verifyOTP function may also have OTP-record isolation issues. An attacker may associate another person's phone number with an attacker-controlled account, causing a later legitimate phone sign-in to create a session for that account; the OTP itself is not bypassed. The attacker must be able to submit a phone number through an affected public flow before it is verified.
mitigation
Upgrade better-auth to 1.7.16, or to 1.8.0-beta.5 on the beta release line. If adopting 1.7.16, remove phone numbers that were stored without verification and prevent public flows from saving phone numbers before verification.
fixed in 1.7.16, 1.8.0-beta.5
outcome
Contextual, not validated: no deterministic check could cover this one, and no technique passed our review.
source signals
Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.
- 2026-11-03 21:37Zghsa: trigger signal, started the run
this entry in the feed
GET /api/v1/feed/ETK-2026-3419
{ "etk_id": "ETK-2026-3419", "cve_id": null, "display_id": "ETK-2026-3419", "ghsa_id": "GHSA-q747-mqgr-4gh7", "euvd_id": null, "status": "published", "anchor_state": "awaiting_cve", "title": "Unverified phone-number account binding in better-auth", "summary": "Deployments using the better-auth phone-number plugin are affected by improper handling of unverified phone numbers; installations without a custom verifyOTP function may also have OTP-record isolation issues. An attacker may associate another person's phone number with an attacker-controlled account, causing a later legitimate phone sign-in to create a session for that account; the OTP itself is not bypassed. The attacker must be able to submit a phone number through an affected public flow before it is verified.", "mitigation": "Upgrade better-auth to 1.7.16, or to 1.8.0-beta.5 on the beta release line. If adopting 1.7.16, remove phone numbers that were stored without verification and prevent public flows from saving phone numbers before verification.", "vendor": "npm", "product": "better-auth", "affected": [ { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ ">= 0.4.12-beta.7, < 1.7.16" ], "ecosystem": "npm", "fixed_versions": [ "1.7.16" ], "package_name": "better-auth", "purl": "pkg:npm/better-auth" }, { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ ">= 1.8.0-beta.0, < 1.8.0-beta.5" ], "ecosystem": "npm", "fixed_versions": [ "1.8.0-beta.5" ], "package_name": "better-auth", "purl": "pkg:npm/better-auth" } ], "cwes": [ 287 ], "cvss_score": 8.1, "cvss_src": "cna_vendor", "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N", "epss_score": null, "epss_percentile": null, "epss_asof": null, "automation": "contextual", "check": false, "check_confidence_basis": null, "exploit": false, "pipeline_minutes": 10.1089863, "t0_at": null, "signals": { "trigger_signal": { "at": "2026-11-03T21:37:45+00:00", "days": -0.765903069837963, "is_lower_bound": true, "measured_at": "2026-11-04T16:00:39.064492+00:00", "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-q747-mqgr-4gh7" } } }
published 2026-11-03 23:41Z
last change 2026-11-04 15:49Z
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