ETK-2026-3337Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number.
waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.description
auth-framework 0.4.x does not consistently enforce JWT validity claims such as expiration, issuer, audience, and token type when applications rely on its validator. An attacker able to submit a token to affected token-exchange or related validation flows may have expired or otherwise unsuitable tokens accepted; an introspection-related path can also treat a decodable token with an invalid signature as valid. Exposure depends on an application trusting these affected validation results.
mitigation
Upgrade auth-framework to 0.5.0-rc87 or later and configure the accepted issuers and audiences. Until upgraded, independently enforce expiration, not-before, issuer, and audience checks, and verify JWT signatures before using introspection-based validation paths.
outcome
Contextual, not validated: no deterministic check could cover this one, and no technique passed our review.
source signals
Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.
- 2026-11-03 05:03Zghsa: trigger signal, started the run
this entry in the feed
GET /api/v1/feed/ETK-2026-3337
{ "etk_id": "ETK-2026-3337", "cve_id": null, "display_id": "ETK-2026-3337", "ghsa_id": "GHSA-25hm-7cc9-526q", "euvd_id": null, "status": "published", "anchor_state": "awaiting_cve", "title": "Improper JWT validation in auth-framework", "summary": "auth-framework 0.4.x does not consistently enforce JWT validity claims such as expiration, issuer, audience, and token type when applications rely on its validator. An attacker able to submit a token to affected token-exchange or related validation flows may have expired or otherwise unsuitable tokens accepted; an introspection-related path can also treat a decodable token with an invalid signature as valid. Exposure depends on an application trusting these affected validation results.", "mitigation": "Upgrade auth-framework to 0.5.0-rc87 or later and configure the accepted issuers and audiences. Until upgraded, independently enforce expiration, not-before, issuer, and audience checks, and verify JWT signatures before using introspection-based validation paths.", "vendor": "rust", "product": "rust:auth-framework", "affected": [ { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ ">= 0.4.0, < 0.5.0" ], "ecosystem": "rust", "fixed_versions": [], "package_name": "auth-framework", "purl": "pkg:cargo/auth-framework" } ], "cwes": [ 345 ], "cvss_score": 7.1, "cvss_src": "cna_vendor", "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N", "epss_score": null, "epss_percentile": null, "epss_asof": null, "automation": "contextual", "check": false, "check_confidence_basis": null, "exploit": false, "pipeline_minutes": 19.342836366666667, "t0_at": null, "signals": { "trigger_signal": { "at": "2026-11-03T05:03:13+00:00", "days": -0.07261380857638888, "is_lower_bound": true, "measured_at": "2026-11-03T06:47:46.886160+00:00", "url": "https://github.com/ciresnave/auth-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-25hm-7cc9-526q" } } }
published 2026-11-03 06:03Z
last change 2026-11-03 06:36Z
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