ETK-2026-1042Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number.

waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.

GHSA-2xjh-wg9w-g5hc ↗

no check availablenot proven exploitable
awaiting cvepublic pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).−13dkevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
rust:tari_state_tree <= 0.43.0
CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
ETK-2026-1042Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number., no cve assigned
pkg:cargo/tari_state_tree
pkg:cargo/tari_ootle_storage
pkg:cargo/tari_indexer_lib
12d 08h 46msince last run
19mAI analysisAnalysis: how long the AI spent reversing this signal.
timeline
0 = trigger signal
trigger signal +0dpublic poc+0dwaiting for further signals+0.7d
0
+5d
+10d

description

tari_state_tree, tari_ootle_storage, and tari_indexer_lib are affected when an indexer verifies substate-absence proofs. A malicious validator able to provide substate RPC responses to an indexer can make a live substate appear absent, causing cached indexer data and wallet displays to omit live UTXOs or balances. The attacker needs to be a serving validator for the relevant indexer; on-chain state and spend validation are not affected.

mitigation

Treat absence responses from a single validator as untrusted, and independently corroborate them before caching or presenting them to wallets. No corrected release is recorded; restrict indexer RPC sources to trusted validators and monitor upstream for a patched version.

check
no
exploit
no
automationDeterministic: a check that runs on its own, the same request on every target. Contextual: an agentic technique that needs to be applied per target, for bugs that depend on contextual flows.
contextual
auth requiredWhether an attacker needs an account first, based on the CVSS vector's Privileges Required.
no
EPSSEstimate of the chance this CVE is exploited in the next 30 days. Refreshed daily.
–
agent run time
19m
cve.org record, t = 0The moment cve.org publishes the CVE in full.
not published yet
Δ to public pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).
−13d
Δ to kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
–

outcome

Contextual: an exploit technique exists, but no deterministic check could cover this one.

source signals

Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.

  1. 2026-10-08 12:42Z
  2. 2026-10-08 12:42Z

this entry in the feed

GET /api/v1/feed/ETK-2026-1042

{
  "etk_id": "ETK-2026-1042",
  "cve_id": null,
  "display_id": "ETK-2026-1042",
  "ghsa_id": "GHSA-2xjh-wg9w-g5hc",
  "euvd_id": null,
  "status": "published",
  "anchor_state": "awaiting_cve",
  "title": "Shard-binding failure in tari_state_tree exclusion proofs",
  "summary": "`tari_state_tree`, `tari_ootle_storage`, and `tari_indexer_lib` are affected when an indexer verifies substate-absence proofs. A malicious validator able to provide substate RPC responses to an indexer can make a live substate appear absent, causing cached indexer data and wallet displays to omit live UTXOs or balances. The attacker needs to be a serving validator for the relevant indexer; on-chain state and spend validation are not affected.",
  "mitigation": "Treat absence responses from a single validator as untrusted, and independently corroborate them before caching or presenting them to wallets. No corrected release is recorded; restrict indexer RPC sources to trusted validators and monitor upstream for a patched version.",
  "vendor": "rust",
  "product": "rust:tari_state_tree",
  "affected": [
    {
      "affected_notes": [],
      "affected_ranges": [
        "<= 0.43.0"
      ],
      "ecosystem": "rust",
      "fixed_versions": [],
      "package_name": "tari_state_tree",
      "purl": "pkg:cargo/tari_state_tree"
    },
    {
      "affected_notes": [],
      "affected_ranges": [
        "<= 0.43.0"
      ],
      "ecosystem": "rust",
      "fixed_versions": [],
      "package_name": "tari_ootle_storage",
      "purl": "pkg:cargo/tari_ootle_storage"
    },
    {
      "affected_notes": [],
      "affected_ranges": [
        "<= 0.43.0"
      ],
      "ecosystem": "rust",
      "fixed_versions": [],
      "package_name": "tari_indexer_lib",
      "purl": "pkg:cargo/tari_indexer_lib"
    }
  ],
  "cwes": [
    345
  ],
  "cvss_score": 8.8,
  "cvss_src": "cna_vendor",
  "cvss_vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
  "epss_score": null,
  "epss_percentile": null,
  "epss_asof": null,
  "automation": "contextual",
  "check": false,
  "check_confidence_basis": null,
  "exploit": false,
  "pipeline_minutes": 18.577538183333335,
  "t0_at": null,
  "signals": {
    "public_poc": {
      "at": "2026-10-08T12:42:14+00:00",
      "days": -13.038107329895833,
      "is_lower_bound": true,
      "measured_at": "2026-10-21T13:37:06.631488+00:00",
      "url": "https://github.com/tari-project/tari-ootle/security/advisories/GHSA-2xjh-wg9w-g5hc"
    },
    "trigger_signal": {
      "at": "2026-10-08T12:42:14+00:00",
      "days": -13.038107329895833,
      "is_lower_bound": true,
      "measured_at": "2026-10-21T13:37:06.631488+00:00",
      "url": "https://github.com/tari-project/tari-ootle/security/advisories/GHSA-2xjh-wg9w-g5hc"
    }
  }
}

published 2026-10-09 04:32Z
last change 2026-10-21 13:29Z

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