CVE-2026-86983

waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.

GHSA-jwv7-rv4f-rff2 ↗EUVD-2026-112556 ↗

no check availablenot proven exploitable
cve.orgpublic pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
Apple swift-crypto >= 3.10.0, <= 5.0.2
fixed in 5.0.3
ETK-2026-2919Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number., permanent identifier
pkg:swift/swift-crypto
cvss7.0ethiack provisional
6h 13msince last run
24mAI analysisAnalysis: how long the AI spent reversing this signal.
timeline
0 = cve.org publication
trigger signal (cve.org) +0hwaiting for further signals+1h26m
0
+2h
+4h
+6h
+8h
+10h
+12h

description

swift-crypto versions before 5.0.3 are affected by an input-length handling issue in the P-384 VOPRF API. A remote attacker may terminate a process if it passes attacker-controlled, unbounded input to that API.

mitigation

Upgrade swift-crypto to version 5.0.3 or later. Until upgrade, ensure input reaching the P-384 VOPRF API is length-bounded and does not originate directly from untrusted sources.

fixed in 5.0.3

check
no
exploit
no
automationDeterministic: a check that runs on its own, the same request on every target. Contextual: an agentic technique that needs to be applied per target, for bugs that depend on contextual flows.
contextual
auth requiredWhether an attacker needs an account first, based on the CVSS vector's Privileges Required.
–
EPSSEstimate of the chance this CVE is exploited in the next 30 days. Refreshed daily.
–
agent run time
24m
cve.org record, t = 0The moment cve.org publishes the CVE in full.
2026-10-28 23:01Z
Δ to public pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).
–
Δ to kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
–

outcome

Contextual, not validated: no deterministic check could cover this one, and no technique passed our review.

source signals

Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.

  1. 2026-10-28 23:01Z
    cve_org: trigger signal, started the run

this entry in the feed

GET /api/v1/feed/CVE-2026-86983

{
  "etk_id": "ETK-2026-2919",
  "cve_id": "CVE-2026-86983",
  "display_id": "CVE-2026-86983",
  "ghsa_id": "GHSA-jwv7-rv4f-rff2",
  "euvd_id": "EUVD-2026-112556",
  "status": "published",
  "anchor_state": "anchored",
  "title": "Input-length denial of service in swift-crypto P-384 VOPRF",
  "summary": "swift-crypto versions before 5.0.3 are affected by an input-length handling issue in the P-384 VOPRF API. A remote attacker may terminate a process if it passes attacker-controlled, unbounded input to that API.",
  "mitigation": "Upgrade swift-crypto to version 5.0.3 or later. Until upgrade, ensure input reaching the P-384 VOPRF API is length-bounded and does not originate directly from untrusted sources.",
  "vendor": "Apple",
  "product": "swift-crypto",
  "affected": [
    {
      "affected_notes": [],
      "affected_ranges": [
        ">= 3.10.0, <= 5.0.2"
      ],
      "ecosystem": "swift",
      "fixed_versions": [
        "5.0.3"
      ],
      "package_name": "swift-crypto",
      "purl": "pkg:swift/swift-crypto"
    }
  ],
  "cwes": null,
  "cvss_score": 7,
  "cvss_src": "ethiack_provisional",
  "cvss_vector": null,
  "epss_score": null,
  "epss_percentile": null,
  "epss_asof": null,
  "automation": "contextual",
  "check": false,
  "check_confidence_basis": null,
  "exploit": false,
  "pipeline_minutes": 23.643413116666668,
  "t0_at": "2026-10-28T23:01:59.598000+00:00",
  "signals": {
    "trigger_signal": {
      "at": "2026-10-28T23:01:59.598000+00:00",
      "days": 0,
      "is_lower_bound": false,
      "measured_at": "2026-10-28T23:01:59.598000+00:00",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-86983"
    }
  }
}

published 2026-10-29 00:04Z
last change 2026-10-29 04:54Z

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