CVE-2026-65219

waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.

GHSA-hjj8-98hq-9pcr ↗EUVD-2026-110635 ↗

no check availablenot proven exploitable
cve.orgpublic pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
SMCI MBD-X12SPI 1.07.20
CWE-696 Incorrect Behavior Order
ETK-2026-2740Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number., permanent identifier
2h 40msince last run
23mAI analysisAnalysis: how long the AI spent reversing this signal.
timeline
0 = trigger signal
trigger signal (cve.org) +0hwaiting for further signals+0h32m
0
+2h
+4h
+6h
+8h
+10h
+12h

description

SMCI MBD-X12SPI BMC firmware is affected by an authentication bypass in its RAKP+ handling. An attacker able to reach the BMC's IPMI/RMCP+ service may establish a management session and potentially issue commands without valid credentials.

mitigation

Restrict IPMI/RMCP+ and BMC management access to trusted administrative networks, and remove Internet exposure. Obtain and apply the current BMC firmware update from Supermicro when a supported fixed release is identified.

check
no
exploit
no
automationDeterministic: a check that runs on its own, the same request on every target. Contextual: an agentic technique that needs to be applied per target, for bugs that depend on contextual flows.
contextual
auth requiredWhether an attacker needs an account first, based on the CVSS vector's Privileges Required.
no
EPSSEstimate of the chance this CVE is exploited in the next 30 days. Refreshed daily.
–
agent run time
23m
cve.org record, t = 0The moment cve.org publishes the CVE in full.
2026-10-27 07:57Z
Δ to public pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).
–
Δ to kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
–

outcome

Contextual, not validated: no deterministic check could cover this one, and no technique passed our review.

source signals

Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.

  1. 2026-10-27 07:57Z
    cve_org: trigger signal, started the run

this entry in the feed

GET /api/v1/feed/CVE-2026-65219

{
  "etk_id": "ETK-2026-2740",
  "cve_id": "CVE-2026-65219",
  "display_id": "CVE-2026-65219",
  "ghsa_id": "GHSA-hjj8-98hq-9pcr",
  "euvd_id": "EUVD-2026-110635",
  "status": "published",
  "anchor_state": "anchored",
  "title": "RAKP+ authentication bypass in SMCI MBD-X12SPI BMC",
  "summary": "SMCI MBD-X12SPI BMC firmware is affected by an authentication bypass in its RAKP+ handling. An attacker able to reach the BMC's IPMI/RMCP+ service may establish a management session and potentially issue commands without valid credentials.",
  "mitigation": "Restrict IPMI/RMCP+ and BMC management access to trusted administrative networks, and remove Internet exposure. Obtain and apply the current BMC firmware update from Supermicro when a supported fixed release is identified.",
  "vendor": "SMCI",
  "product": "MBD-X12SPI",
  "affected": [
    {
      "affected_notes": [],
      "affected_ranges": [
        "1.07.20"
      ],
      "ecosystem": null,
      "fixed_versions": [],
      "package_name": "MBD-X12SPI",
      "purl": null
    }
  ],
  "cwes": [
    696
  ],
  "cvss_score": 7.4,
  "cvss_src": "cna_vendor",
  "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
  "epss_score": null,
  "epss_percentile": null,
  "epss_asof": null,
  "automation": "contextual",
  "check": false,
  "check_confidence_basis": null,
  "exploit": false,
  "pipeline_minutes": 22.561144633333335,
  "t0_at": "2026-10-27T07:57:12.003000+00:00",
  "signals": {
    "trigger_signal": {
      "at": "2026-10-27T07:57:12.003000+00:00",
      "days": 0,
      "is_lower_bound": false,
      "measured_at": "2026-10-27T07:57:12.003000+00:00",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65219"
    }
  }
}

published 2026-10-27 08:06Z
last change 2026-10-27 11:00Z

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