CVE-2026-115407
waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.GHSA-9q64-h4f4-jp28 ↗EUVD-2026-131649 ↗
description
Affected crypto11 v2 releases through 2.0.0-rc8 accept invalid and empty nonces in the AEAD returned by SecretKey.NewGCM(). An attacker who can influence nonce values may trigger GCM IV reuse on tokens that accept zero-length IVs, allowing disclosure of encrypted data and message forgery; misconfigured HSM-generated-IV mode can also cause failures or nonce mismatches.
mitigation
Reject empty or incorrectly sized nonces before calling Seal, and ensure every GCM nonce is unique for its key. Disable UseGCMIVFromHSM unless GCMIVFromHSMControl is configured to provide storage for the token-generated IV.
outcome
Contextual, not validated: no deterministic check could cover this one, and no technique passed our review.
source signals
Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.
- 2026-11-20 16:10Zghsa: trigger signal, started the run
- 2026-11-20 16:10Zcve.org record for CVE-2026-115407
- 2026-11-20 19:11Zexploit reference (github.com)
this entry in the feed
GET /api/v1/feed/CVE-2026-115407
{ "etk_id": "ETK-2026-5080", "cve_id": "CVE-2026-115407", "display_id": "CVE-2026-115407", "ghsa_id": "GHSA-9q64-h4f4-jp28", "euvd_id": "EUVD-2026-131649", "status": "published", "anchor_state": "anchored", "title": "GCM nonce validation flaw in crypto11", "summary": "Affected crypto11 v2 releases through 2.0.0-rc8 accept invalid and empty nonces in the AEAD returned by SecretKey.NewGCM(). An attacker who can influence nonce values may trigger GCM IV reuse on tokens that accept zero-length IVs, allowing disclosure of encrypted data and message forgery; misconfigured HSM-generated-IV mode can also cause failures or nonce mismatches.", "mitigation": "Reject empty or incorrectly sized nonces before calling Seal, and ensure every GCM nonce is unique for its key. Disable UseGCMIVFromHSM unless GCMIVFromHSMControl is configured to provide storage for the token-generated IV.", "vendor": "Eclipse Foundation", "product": "github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2", "affected": [ { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ ">= 0, <= 2.0.0-rc8" ], "ecosystem": null, "fixed_versions": [], "package_name": "github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2", "purl": null }, { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ ">= 0, <= 1.6.8" ], "ecosystem": null, "fixed_versions": [], "package_name": "github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11", "purl": null }, { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ ">= 0, <= 1.7.0-rc1" ], "ecosystem": null, "fixed_versions": [], "package_name": "github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11", "purl": null }, { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ ">= 0, <= 1.2.5" ], "ecosystem": null, "fixed_versions": [], "package_name": "github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11", "purl": null } ], "cwes": null, "cvss_score": 9.1, "cvss_src": "cna_vendor", "cvss_vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "epss_score": null, "epss_percentile": null, "epss_asof": null, "automation": "contextual", "check": false, "check_confidence_basis": null, "exploit": false, "pipeline_minutes": 10.76718225, "t0_at": "2026-11-20T16:10:45.740000+00:00", "signals": { "public_poc": { "at": "2026-11-20T18:35:47.037000+00:00", "days": 0.10070945601851852, "is_lower_bound": false, "measured_at": "2026-11-20T16:10:45.740000+00:00", "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/security/advisories/GHSA-c2cp-4qw8-q4jg" }, "trigger_signal": { "at": "2026-11-20T16:10:45.740000+00:00", "days": 0, "is_lower_bound": false, "measured_at": "2026-11-20T16:10:45.740000+00:00", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9q64-h4f4-jp28" } } }
published 2026-11-20 18:58Z
last change 2026-11-20 19:11Z
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