CVE-2026-114638

waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.

GHSA-378g-rwj7-qp6j ↗EUVD-2026-107893 ↗

no check availablenot proven exploitable
cve.orgpublic pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
traefik >= 3.7.0, < 3.7.14
fixed in 3.7.14
ETK-2026-2391Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number., permanent identifier
1h 12msince last run
38mAI analysisAnalysis: how long the AI spent reversing this signal.
timeline
0 = cve.org publication
trigger signal (cve.org) +0hwaiting for further signals+2h41m
0
+2h
+4h
+6h
+8h
+10h
+12h

description

Traefik 3.7.0 through 3.7.13 using the Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider can apply the wrong client CA to an Ingress host. An attacker with a client certificate trusted by a different affected host may authenticate to that host when the relevant TLS secret names collide after name normalization.

mitigation

Upgrade Traefik to version 3.7.14 or later. Until upgraded, identify and rename client-CA TLS secrets whose names could collide when dots are converted to dashes.

fixed in 3.7.14

check
no
exploit
no
automationDeterministic: a check that runs on its own, the same request on every target. Contextual: an agentic technique that needs to be applied per target, for bugs that depend on contextual flows.
contextual
auth requiredWhether an attacker needs an account first, based on the CVSS vector's Privileges Required.
no
EPSSEstimate of the chance this CVE is exploited in the next 30 days. Refreshed daily.
–
agent run time
38m
cve.org record, t = 0The moment cve.org publishes the CVE in full.
2026-10-22 01:43Z
Δ to public pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).
–
Δ to kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
–

outcome

Contextual: an exploit technique exists, but no deterministic check could cover this one.

source signals

Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.

  1. 2026-10-22 01:43Z
    ghsa: trigger signal, started the run
  2. 2026-10-22 01:43Z

this entry in the feed

GET /api/v1/feed/CVE-2026-114638

{
  "etk_id": "ETK-2026-2391",
  "cve_id": "CVE-2026-114638",
  "display_id": "CVE-2026-114638",
  "ghsa_id": "GHSA-378g-rwj7-qp6j",
  "euvd_id": "EUVD-2026-107893",
  "status": "published",
  "anchor_state": "anchored",
  "title": "Client certificate authentication bypass in Traefik Kubernetes Ingress",
  "summary": "Traefik 3.7.0 through 3.7.13 using the Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider can apply the wrong client CA to an Ingress host. An attacker with a client certificate trusted by a different affected host may authenticate to that host when the relevant TLS secret names collide after name normalization.",
  "mitigation": "Upgrade Traefik to version 3.7.14 or later. Until upgraded, identify and rename client-CA TLS secrets whose names could collide when dots are converted to dashes.",
  "vendor": "traefik",
  "product": "traefik",
  "affected": [
    {
      "affected_notes": [],
      "affected_ranges": [
        ">= 3.7.0, < 3.7.14"
      ],
      "ecosystem": null,
      "fixed_versions": [
        "3.7.14"
      ],
      "package_name": "traefik",
      "purl": null
    }
  ],
  "cwes": null,
  "cvss_score": 8.7,
  "cvss_src": "cna_vendor",
  "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
  "epss_score": null,
  "epss_percentile": null,
  "epss_asof": null,
  "automation": "contextual",
  "check": false,
  "check_confidence_basis": null,
  "exploit": false,
  "pipeline_minutes": 37.88537045,
  "t0_at": "2026-10-22T01:43:38.571000+00:00",
  "signals": {
    "trigger_signal": {
      "at": "2026-10-22T01:43:38.571000+00:00",
      "days": 0,
      "is_lower_bound": false,
      "measured_at": "2026-10-22T01:43:38.571000+00:00",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-378g-rwj7-qp6j"
    }
  }
}

published 2026-10-22 03:46Z
last change 2026-10-22 05:15Z

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