CVE-2026-106038

waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.

EUVD-2026-93401 ↗

no check availablenot proven exploitable
cve.orgpublic pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
kvcache-ai Mooncake <= 0.3.13.post1
CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
ETK-2026-783, permanent identifier
15d 03h 05msince last run
35mAI analysisAnalysis: how long the AI spent reversing this signal.
timeline
0 = trigger signal
trigger signal (cve.org) +0hwaiting for further signals+2h42m
0
+2h
+4h
+6h
+8h
+10h
+12h

description

Mooncake Store versions through 0.3.13.post1 expose destructive cache operations without client authentication on the coro_rpc service. An attacker able to reach that service can remove cached objects, including broadly selected entries, disrupting requests that depend on the cache.

mitigation

Immediately limit coro_rpc access to trusted hosts and clients using network controls or service isolation. Monitor the project for a corrected Mooncake release, as no fixed version is recorded.

check
no
exploit
no
automationDeterministic: a check that runs on its own, the same request on every target. Contextual: an agentic technique that needs to be applied per target, for bugs that depend on contextual flows.
contextual
auth requiredWhether an attacker needs an account first, based on the CVSS vector's Privileges Required.
no
EPSSEstimate of the chance this CVE is exploited in the next 30 days. Refreshed daily.
0.49%41st percentile
agent run time
35m
cve.org record, t = 0The moment cve.org publishes the CVE in full.
2026-10-06 14:03Z
Δ to public pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).
–
Δ to kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
–

outcome

Contextual: an exploit technique exists, but no deterministic check could cover this one.

source signals

Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.

  1. 2026-10-06 14:03Z
    cve_org: trigger signal, started the run

this entry in the feed

GET /api/v1/feed/CVE-2026-106038

{
  "etk_id": "ETK-2026-783",
  "cve_id": "CVE-2026-106038",
  "display_id": "CVE-2026-106038",
  "ghsa_id": null,
  "euvd_id": "EUVD-2026-93401",
  "status": "published",
  "anchor_state": "anchored",
  "title": "Unauthenticated deletion in Mooncake Store RPC service",
  "summary": "Mooncake Store versions through 0.3.13.post1 expose destructive cache operations without client authentication on the coro_rpc service. An attacker able to reach that service can remove cached objects, including broadly selected entries, disrupting requests that depend on the cache.",
  "mitigation": "Immediately limit coro_rpc access to trusted hosts and clients using network controls or service isolation. Monitor the project for a corrected Mooncake release, as no fixed version is recorded.",
  "vendor": "kvcache-ai",
  "product": "Mooncake",
  "affected": [
    {
      "affected_notes": [],
      "affected_ranges": [
        ">= 0, <= 0.3.13.post1"
      ],
      "ecosystem": null,
      "fixed_versions": [],
      "package_name": "Mooncake",
      "purl": null
    }
  ],
  "cwes": [
    306
  ],
  "cvss_score": 8.8,
  "cvss_src": "cna_vendor",
  "cvss_vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
  "epss_score": 0.0049,
  "epss_percentile": 0.41,
  "epss_asof": "2026-10-20",
  "automation": "contextual",
  "check": false,
  "check_confidence_basis": null,
  "exploit": false,
  "pipeline_minutes": 35.39507283333333,
  "t0_at": "2026-10-06T14:03:15.496000+00:00",
  "signals": {
    "trigger_signal": {
      "at": "2026-10-06T14:03:15.496000+00:00",
      "days": 0,
      "is_lower_bound": false,
      "measured_at": "2026-10-06T14:03:15.496000+00:00",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-106038"
    }
  }
}

published 2026-10-06 16:09Z
last change 2026-10-21 18:33Z

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