ETK-2026-944Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number.
waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.description
The affected crates process cross-shard transaction pledges without cryptographically binding pledged state values to the associated proof, and can retain evidence for locks that were requested but not granted. A Byzantine validator acting as a relevant shard-group proposer or leader may cause execution using altered pledged state or have a transaction accepted despite a lock conflict; multi-shard transaction processing is a prerequisite.
mitigation
Restrict or suspend multi-shard transaction processing where operationally feasible, and tightly control validator and proposer membership. Monitor upstream for a corrected release and upgrade both affected crates when one is published.
outcome
Contextual: an exploit technique exists, but no deterministic check could cover this one.
source signals
Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.
- 2026-10-07 06:07Zghsa: trigger signal, started the run
this entry in the feed
GET /api/v1/feed/ETK-2026-944
{ "etk_id": "ETK-2026-944", "cve_id": null, "display_id": "ETK-2026-944", "ghsa_id": "GHSA-5rwq-wm3x-mp9v", "euvd_id": null, "status": "published", "anchor_state": "awaiting_cve", "title": "Cross-shard validation flaws in tari_consensus and tari_ootle_storage", "summary": "The affected crates process cross-shard transaction pledges without cryptographically binding pledged state values to the associated proof, and can retain evidence for locks that were requested but not granted. A Byzantine validator acting as a relevant shard-group proposer or leader may cause execution using altered pledged state or have a transaction accepted despite a lock conflict; multi-shard transaction processing is a prerequisite.", "mitigation": "Restrict or suspend multi-shard transaction processing where operationally feasible, and tightly control validator and proposer membership. Monitor upstream for a corrected release and upgrade both affected crates when one is published.", "vendor": "rust", "product": "rust:tari_ootle_storage", "affected": [ { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ "<= 0.43.0" ], "ecosystem": "rust", "fixed_versions": [], "package_name": "tari_ootle_storage", "purl": "pkg:cargo/tari_ootle_storage" }, { "affected_notes": [], "affected_ranges": [ "<= 0.43.0" ], "ecosystem": "rust", "fixed_versions": [], "package_name": "tari_consensus", "purl": "pkg:cargo/tari_consensus" } ], "cwes": [ 345 ], "cvss_score": 7.7, "cvss_src": "cna_vendor", "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N", "epss_score": null, "epss_percentile": null, "epss_asof": null, "automation": "contextual", "check": false, "check_confidence_basis": null, "exploit": false, "pipeline_minutes": 8.9744055, "t0_at": null, "signals": { "trigger_signal": { "at": "2026-10-07T06:07:07+00:00", "days": -14.687822785868056, "is_lower_bound": true, "measured_at": "2026-10-21T22:37:34.927958+00:00", "url": "https://github.com/tari-project/tari-ootle/security/advisories/GHSA-5rwq-wm3x-mp9v" } } }
published 2026-10-08 06:32Z
last change 2026-10-21 22:34Z
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