ETK-2026-944Zero's internal tracking ID, independent of the CVE number.

waiting for further signalsZero needs more public information before it can validate it.

GHSA-5rwq-wm3x-mp9v ↗

no check availablenot proven exploitable
awaiting cvepublic pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
rust:tari_ootle_storage <= 0.43.0
CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
ETK-2026-944, no cve assigned
pkg:cargo/tari_ootle_storage
pkg:cargo/tari_consensus
13d 15h 56msince last run
9mAI analysisAnalysis: how long the AI spent reversing this signal.
timeline
0 = cve.org, not yet published
trigger signal −15dwaiting for further signals−14d
−10d
−5d
0

description

The affected crates process cross-shard transaction pledges without cryptographically binding pledged state values to the associated proof, and can retain evidence for locks that were requested but not granted. A Byzantine validator acting as a relevant shard-group proposer or leader may cause execution using altered pledged state or have a transaction accepted despite a lock conflict; multi-shard transaction processing is a prerequisite.

mitigation

Restrict or suspend multi-shard transaction processing where operationally feasible, and tightly control validator and proposer membership. Monitor upstream for a corrected release and upgrade both affected crates when one is published.

check
no
exploit
no
automationDeterministic: a check that runs on its own, the same request on every target. Contextual: an agentic technique that needs to be applied per target, for bugs that depend on contextual flows.
contextual
auth requiredWhether an attacker needs an account first, based on the CVSS vector's Privileges Required.
yes, low privileges
EPSSEstimate of the chance this CVE is exploited in the next 30 days. Refreshed daily.
–
agent run time
9m
cve.org record, t = 0The moment cve.org publishes the CVE in full.
not published yet
Δ to public pocExploit code has been published by someone. Source signals can also carry a PoC (Proof of Concept).
–
Δ to kevAttacks confirmed in the real world.
–

outcome

Contextual: an exploit technique exists, but no deterministic check could cover this one.

source signals

Public signals that triggered or updated the pipeline. These are inputs for the deltas above.

  1. 2026-10-07 06:07Z

this entry in the feed

GET /api/v1/feed/ETK-2026-944

{
  "etk_id": "ETK-2026-944",
  "cve_id": null,
  "display_id": "ETK-2026-944",
  "ghsa_id": "GHSA-5rwq-wm3x-mp9v",
  "euvd_id": null,
  "status": "published",
  "anchor_state": "awaiting_cve",
  "title": "Cross-shard validation flaws in tari_consensus and tari_ootle_storage",
  "summary": "The affected crates process cross-shard transaction pledges without cryptographically binding pledged state values to the associated proof, and can retain evidence for locks that were requested but not granted. A Byzantine validator acting as a relevant shard-group proposer or leader may cause execution using altered pledged state or have a transaction accepted despite a lock conflict; multi-shard transaction processing is a prerequisite.",
  "mitigation": "Restrict or suspend multi-shard transaction processing where operationally feasible, and tightly control validator and proposer membership. Monitor upstream for a corrected release and upgrade both affected crates when one is published.",
  "vendor": "rust",
  "product": "rust:tari_ootle_storage",
  "affected": [
    {
      "affected_notes": [],
      "affected_ranges": [
        "<= 0.43.0"
      ],
      "ecosystem": "rust",
      "fixed_versions": [],
      "package_name": "tari_ootle_storage",
      "purl": "pkg:cargo/tari_ootle_storage"
    },
    {
      "affected_notes": [],
      "affected_ranges": [
        "<= 0.43.0"
      ],
      "ecosystem": "rust",
      "fixed_versions": [],
      "package_name": "tari_consensus",
      "purl": "pkg:cargo/tari_consensus"
    }
  ],
  "cwes": [
    345
  ],
  "cvss_score": 7.7,
  "cvss_src": "cna_vendor",
  "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
  "epss_score": null,
  "epss_percentile": null,
  "epss_asof": null,
  "automation": "contextual",
  "check": false,
  "check_confidence_basis": null,
  "exploit": false,
  "pipeline_minutes": 8.9744055,
  "t0_at": null,
  "signals": {
    "trigger_signal": {
      "at": "2026-10-07T06:07:07+00:00",
      "days": -14.648459958969907,
      "is_lower_bound": true,
      "measured_at": "2026-10-21T21:40:53.979130+00:00",
      "url": "https://github.com/tari-project/tari-ootle/security/advisories/GHSA-5rwq-wm3x-mp9v"
    }
  }
}

published 2026-10-08 06:32Z
last change 2026-10-21 21:36Z

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